In The Graveyard Of Empires Americas War In Afghanistan

Posted In: Afganistan

Karyl Cappetta says...

This is a well researched book with a lot of comparative statistics and other analysis.Unfortunatly for the author as regards the title of the book, this is not the 19th century or the time of Alexander the Great.The temporal situation, which this book addresses adequately, is not my major concern. The main problem with this book is that the author doesn't address the question "why are we in Afghanistan if this is indeed the graveyard of empires?"Or is "the graveyard of empires"just some romantisized quotation by Rudyard Kipling from a bygone era.With President Obama ready to surge troops into Afghanistan, this is a highly relevant question Mr Jones.The author also fails to stresswhat a unique situation Afghanistan is economically, demographically, geographically, topographically, militarily and a what a highly questionable strategy a surge is (we surged hundreds of thousands of troops into Vietnam with no effect).I've read a lot of books on Afghanistan, and to be fair to the author, no book I've read provided any clear-cut answers.However, the title of this book seems to offer an answer which Mr Jones is not willing to claim.In fact, Mr.Jones (like most authors on the War in Afghanistan) doesn't see Afghanistan as a graveyard at all, but a stategic blunder by the US, which focused too much on Iraq. This book is a good introduction to Afghanistan and provides some interesting (if slightly misleading and unoriginal) analysis. To be blunt, this book is a waste of the reader's time.If you're looking for a review of Afghanistan, read an encyclopedia entry on Afghanistan.

Posted on September 2, 2010

Thersa Laudadio says...

Jones contends that after eight years, the U.S. has only managed to push al Qaida's headquarters about 100 miles down the road - into Pakistan. Not surprising, given that beginning around 330 B.C., Alexander the Great became the first of many known to have suffered staggering losses in the area - after astonishing conquests in Eurasia. Over the next 2,000 years, Ghenghis Khan, Timur, Babur, Britain, and the U.S.S.R. have followed in Alexander's footsteps.



"In the Graveyard of Empires" follows the gradual collapse of governance in the late 1960s and 1970s that culminated in the 1979 Soviet invasion, increased U.S. anti-Soviet involvement (thank you Charlie Wilson), the bloody Afghan civil war in the early 1990s, the rise of the Taliban in the late 1990s, and their subsequent alliance with Osama bin Laden.



Jones also points out, again, that current "strategies" ("door-kicking," bombing) produce lots of unappreciated collateral damage (remember the Korean, Vietnam Wars?), fuel our opponents with monies from drug trafficking, and thrive on blissful ignorance of what happens outside Kabul. (Reminds me of my days in the Central Highlands in Vietnam manning a communications site, listening to locals mislead Gen. Westmoreland regarding the causes and status of a local Montagnard revolt. If only I'd spoken up - Ha, I'd still be in the brig.) Other impediments include a history of warlord feudalism, extortion, and Pakistan's becoming a safe haven.



Finally, there's also the issue of Afghanistani government failure - an inability (because of preceding reasons)to provide security and other basic services to citizens around the country. Jones cites this as an important reason for its collapse - an interesting vision of the outcome comparison for conservatives in the U.S. arguing government is inherently incompetent and should be done away with as much as possible.

Posted on September 3, 2010

Cameron Ullrich says...

I have served in Afghanistan several times, so was interested in an examination of U.S. efforts there. I was pleasantly surprised. "In the Graveyard of Empires" is the best book I've read on the current situation in Afghanistan. Period. I was particularly impressed by two issues.



The first was the careful, balanced, and detailed look at the rise of the insurgency. Jones's book is not political, but rather thoroughly researched with well over a thousand footnotes -- many of them primary sources (including his own interviews). I suspect there are few, if any, Americans who have the detailed, on-the-ground knowledge of the country that Jones has. The second was the historical nature of the book. Jones looks briefly at the Alexander the Great era, but has some great chapters up front that cite declassified U.S., KGB, and other intelligence assessments. Really solid work.



In sum, I would strongly recommend this book to any one -- Republican, Democrat, independent, or other -- that has an interest in Afghanistan. This is the best there is on the market.

Posted on September 3, 2010

Leonia Bienvenue says...

As a military professional with more than a general understanding of Afghanistan and the current operating environment, this was a "must purchase" for me. While the book did not provide me with any NEW insights into the operating environment, it did not disappoint as a very clearly written and detailed overview of US operations from 2001-2008.This will become a must read for members of my staff trying to develop an understanding of the problem-set in Afghanistan.

Posted on September 4, 2010

Rema Shipler says...

In the Graveyard of Empires, by Seth G. Jones, is a useful history of the U.S. Government's involvement in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s and again after September 11, 2001.



During the Zahir Shah monarchy (1963-1973), an "era of modernity and democratic freedom," Jones says that the weak central government was able to achieve stability through power sharing arrangements with local entities.Eventually, corruption, slow economic progress, and Shah's remote style of governance undermined his government, and coups in 1973 and 1978 led to rule by a revolutionary council that established a new Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.The council was split between a faction that wanted to install a Soviet-style communist regime and a competing faction that wanted to move more gradually toward socialism.Both of these factions were violently opposed in rural areas by Islamists.



Fearing that the United States and Pakistan would take advantage of the disorder to increase their influence in Afghanistan, the Soviets began their occupation of the country in December 1979.In response, Jones, says, the CIA began a modest program of assistance to mujahideen forces that grew to reach $4 billion to $5 billion dollars between 1980 and 1992.Saudi Arabia provided similar sums, and additional contributions came from Islamic foundations.



The Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, and the U.S. embassy closed the same year - not to open again until 2001.Jones cites a State Department cable as saying that "the withdrawal of Soviet forces in February 1989 and fall of the communist regime in April 1992, set the stage for a more or less open competition for influence in Afghanistan between Pakistan and Iran."India joined Iran in providing support to the Rabbani government and Ahmed Shah Massoud's Jamiat-e-Islami in Northern Afghanistan, while Pakistan and Saudi Arabia supported Pashtun forces.



In 1994, the Taliban movement emerged in Southern Afghanistan, seeking to cleanse the country of conflict and purify its religious and social institutions.Ironically, the Taliban movement drew important financial strength from opium poppy cultivation, which it considered permissible because opium was consumed by Westerners. Another key source of financial support was Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which had also been active in supporting mujahideen forces during the Soviet occupation.



Osama bin Laden went to Afghanistan when he was expelled from Sudan in 1996.According to Jones, "the Taliban entrusted to Osama bin Laden control of most non-Pakistani and non-Afghan militant groups" in Afghanistan.After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Government used special forces to support the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, which collapsed almost immediately.The interim administration led by Hamid Karzai, took office in December 2001.



Despite the impressive victory over the Taliban, large numbers of fighters escaped into Pakistan, and the Taliban continued to launch attacks from Pakistan.Still, levels of violence in Afghanistan were relatively low, important progress was made in basic education, and in 2005, 83 percent of Afghans rated President Karzai's performance as excellent or good.



At this time, the low-level insurgency against the Karzai government was gathering strength.According to Jones, Karzai's government was perceived to be corrupt, and people began to lose confidence in the ability of the government to improve living standards.The religious ideologues directing the insurgency needed

a supply of disgruntled young men, and weak governance produced them.A key failure of the government and its supporters was the inability to field a capable, credible police force to reasonably ensure public security.As the insurgency built momentum, Jones says, a lack of sufficient support from the United States and NATO for the government, and more effective support from outside groups for the insurgents, also contributed to the strength of the insurgency.



To stabilize Afghanistan and suppress the insurgency, Jones says that it is critical to take on corruption, develop partnerships with local entities as well as the central government, and eliminate insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan.



Jones disciplines his narrative with a rigorous analytical framework, and the book benefits from his access to senior U.S. Government officials.His material is adequately sourced, although some of the most surprising and interesting statements in the book are sourced anonymously.There are good maps and a useful chronology.The index is adequate but it is not as complete as it could be: for example, it omits "corruption," "nation building," and "police training," all of which are integral to Jones' explanation of how the insurgency found its legs after 2005.

Posted on September 4, 2010

Terry Strop says...

Dr Seth Jones has written an excllent academic piece on Afghanistan. He's made more trips than most scholars and defense experts, and he is one of the more articulate and knowledgeable specialists on this unique country.



But he misses the point of what works in Afghanistan, and that's a major disappointment.



Counterinsurgency operations - Marine Corps style - is clearly working in Afghanistan, yet Dr. Jones spends almost no time on 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade's successes in Helmand Province, along with Nimroz, and Farah.



Nawa - Now Zad - Khanesian Castle - Golestan - Delaram...the list of towns and villages brought back to life by Marine COIN grow daily; yet Dr. Jones's "Big Picture" view from Kabul ignores what's happening in the south. A shame, really, when one looks at the 30,000 refugees who have moved back into Now Zad after the Marines cleared out the Taliban.



Let's remember, even if Dr Jones did not; the US differs from the Brtis, Russians, Sikunder Dulkhan in our mission: we're not looking to stay; the Afghans know it, and hence we're percieved far differently than the stories he relates.



But in the scheme of books available on the market today: this is clearly the best.

Posted on September 5, 2010

Charita Janecek says...

I have worked for a range of non-governmental organizations in South Asia for nearly three decades, including in Afghanistan several times during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. I have also read most of the good books on Afghanistan -- such as Ahmed Rashid's "Taliban" and "Descent into Chaos," Steve Coll's "Ghost Wars," Louis Dupree's phenomenal "Afghanistan," and the work of many others like Thomas Barfield, Antonio Giustozzi, and Abdulkader Sinno. So I consider myself fairly well-versed on the ground truths and academic/policy research.



In that vein, this book is fantastic. It is solid in its accuracy and careful, balanced research. And it exposes a range of challenges faced in Afghanistan and the mistakes (and successes) made by the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan governments.



In sum, there is no better book on Afghanistan today -- and how we got here. In addition, the short discussion on Afghanistan in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s is just enough to bring people up to speed on lessons from Afghanistan's recent history.

Posted on September 5, 2010

Cora Traphagen says...

"In the Graveyard of Empires" is a workmanlike study of America's failed enterprise in Afghanistan.The basic story is well known:After the Taliban were toppled in 2001, the Bush Administration and the Pentagon were eager to move on and invade Iraq.Afghanistan became a low priority.Too few troops were deployed to stabilize the country, and too little development aid was committed to rebuild the economy.As a result, the central government never establshed its writ outside the major cities.The Taliban were given time and space to regroup, and they eventually moved into the power vacuum.Now 100,000 U.S. troops are fighting a serious insurgency in a land notorious for casting out foreign invaders. Every American should read the book, especially Republicans who think Bush and Cheney "kept us safe" after 9/11.



However, I knocked off one star because the book is based overwhelmingly on U.S. government sources.A few paragraphs even read like USG power point presentations!The sad truth is that U.S. diplomats, spies, and soldiers are at sea in a country like Afghanistan:they arrive with little area expertise, rarely stay for more than a year, and recycle second- and third-hand information from a narrow range of local contacts.(Ambassador Khalizad was an exception -- but he was pulled out of Kabul to serve in Baghdad!) These limitations are a fact of life in the foreign policy bureaucracy, but a book should be better than that.Any serious study of the Afghan war must include information culled from local and, particularly, Taliban sources.Yet Afghans rarely appear in "In the Graveyard of Empires."



It's too bad.It keeps this good book from being a great one.

Posted on September 5, 2010

Alia Psomiades says...

Dr. Seth Jones provides an excellent book on the current struggle to stabilizing Afghanistan.Information on the different tribal factors and history of the country are broadly explained as to why stabilization is difficult.The book is written neutrally pointing out both the positive and negative actions that have been performed.There are also many footnotes for the reader to compare and perform their own research on the topic.



The key areas that Dr. Jones points out are the complexity of the Afghan tribal system and the negative influence that Pakistan has towards the stability of Afghanistan and significant Saudi influence in money and extreme religious teachings."God's Terrorist's" by Charles Allen, provides excellent insight and viewpoints on the extremist views and influence.



Dr. Jones' insight into local tribes to be empowered for their self defense might be a key part to the future stability of Afghanistan.After reading "Decent into Chaos" by Ahmed Rashid, each author has points that coincide with each other.This book does not provide a "roadmap" for future success nor is it a research paper that provides the full documented history of Afghanistan.



If one spends time discussing with the soldiers who have served in Afghanistan since the beginning, Dr. Jones' comments on how the Iraq first policy has hindered Afghan stabilization is very, very evident.And yes, Dr. Jones has spent a few months in Afghanistan in 2009 (when the book was released), so he does have ground knowledge and had direct interaction with the Afghan people and government.Definitely worth reading at least from the library as an overview, for a collector, a good addition, especially for the footnotes/ references for the reader's own independent research.

Posted on September 9, 2010

Rafaela Spratley says...

Seth Jones' analysis "In the Graveyard of Empires" has made a timely appearance, as it fortuitously coincides with the Obama Administration's review of the current US/NATO approach to the twin issues of "nation-building" and security in Afghanistan. While about half the book recapitulates history aptly summarized elsewhere (Rashid's, "Descent into Chaos" and "Taliban", Coll's, "Ghost Wars" are three recent and outstanding examples), the synopsis is necessary background to the analysis that follows.The second half of the book relies heavily on Jones' original "on-site" research and extensive interviews conducted with a variety of sources (mostly Western).This section of the book objectively summarizes the facts, places them in context and clearly identifies opinion.In short, "Graveyard" is an excellent introduction to the topic and supplies the reader with sufficient information to permit the development a genuinely informed opinion on a very complex issue.



First, why exactly is Afghanistan called the "Graveyard of Empires"?Jones begins his history with Alexander, extends it through the Persians, the British, the Russians and focuses finally on the U.S.His argument, in brief, is that Afghanistan is a tribal society with a "warrior" tradition.It has numerous ethnic groups with enduring and ancient rivalries.There are numerous languages.The borders were artifically drawn (by Britain; the so-called, "Durand Line") and specifically created to divide various tribal groups to facilitate colonial control but create internecine friction.It lacks a history of a strong central government.It has a history of sustaining fractious warlords.It is Islamic.It is mountainous and surrounded by neighbors with a "interest" in the area and a penchant for meddling in Afghan affairs.It is (to cite another favorite trope), the land of "The Great Game". Due to this long and disputatious history, its hardly suprising that the U.S. did not receive bouquets of flowers and lots of "warm fuzzies" after the Taliban was booted from power.



Second and maybe most importantly, what does this background portend for the U.S.?The answer to this question comprises the second part of the book.If only one pithy phrase was to be selected on this topic, it would be "mission myopia".Originally, the Bush Administration's goal in Afghanistan was the elimination of Osama bin Ladin's terror network.This group, as is now universally known, was headquartered in Afghanistan and strongly supported by the Taliban government.The Taliban was (and is) a viciously fundamentalist organization which shared (and still does) a consanguinity of interests with the equally vicious, revanchist, Islamist Osama group. For opaque reasons, the U.S. mission initially focused exclusively on elimination of Osama and company and, once Osama trotted across the porous border with Pakistan, the U.S. essentially lost interest in the Taliban.Unfortunately, the contemporaneous situation in Iraq further distracted U.S. interest and absorbed many resources necessary for stabilizing, clearing and holding Afghanistan.By committing insufficent resources (financial, personnel), by failing to maintain historical perspective (see above) and by dint of a recalcitrant ideology (see Donald Rumsfeld's obtuse remarks on "nation building" and NATO scattered throughout the book), the U.S. and its benighted allies set the stage for the ensuing debacle.Naturally, the corrupt and inefficient Afghan government aggrevated the situation and, into the power vacuum stepped the toxic mixture of warlords, drug barons, Pakistani ISI operatives, Iranian Revolutionary Guards, resurgent Taliban and, of course, Osama's minions, too.



Finally, what to do about it all.Here is where the real problem lies.Until a communality of interests and goals by the NATO allies can be established;until adequate resources for clearing, holding and building (David Galula's and Roger Trinquier's classic formulations) are committed;until the Afghani government can rid itself of corruption and develop a "service" perspective and approach and, most crucially, until Pakistan can be convinced to "leave Afghanistan to the Afghans", nothing the U.S. favors will happen.Jones makes all of this crystalline clear, so failure cannot be based on the pretext of ignorance.



What are the shortcomings of this book?Frankly, very few.Some of Jones' characterization of combat commanders are a bit too adulatory (all U.S. commanders are "brillainte", "tall", "committed", etc, etc). There is a small element of Tom Clancy-like reverence for high-tech war implements.That's about it.



In conclusion, this book includes all the necessary background required for understanding the current dilemma in this remote but critically important corner of Southeast Asia.It is entirely self-contained (i.e., no background knowledge is required to understand it). In other words, its well worth reading.

Posted on September 13, 2010