Pacification In Algeria 19561958

Posted In: Algeria

Lyndia Theodoropoulo says...

Excellent reading for anyone interested in Algeria or counterinsurgency warfare.As a history of his experiences and not theory as with his other book (also highly recommended), it is a much more readable format.Galula comes across as part Peace Corps Volunteer, part Colonel Kurtz and totally brilliant.

Posted on July 16, 2011

Johnie Mateer says...

David Galula, a veritable Cassandra of counter-insurgency warfare has, thanks to the Iraq and Afghan wars, risen anew from the "dustbin of history" to have his pithy observations on the nature and conduct of "revolutionary wars" considered again.



This book is a coda to Galula's magnum opus, "Counterinsurgency Warfare".Both books are well worth reading, but "Counterinsurgency Warfare" is the more cogently argued and less anecdotal of the two.Many of the vignettes Galula recites in "Pacification" are idiosyncratic to the Algerian conflict.For example, the overwhelming material and organizational weaknesses of the FLN, their inability to effectively communicate with "the masses" and their relative isolation are not features of most current insurgencies.The ability of the French to effectively seal the Algerian frontiers, thus interdicting flow of men and supplies to the FLN is also unique to that conflict.In addition, Galula focuses almost exclusively on his pacification campaign in Kabylia, only providing occasional glances at the terror campaign being waged in Algiers, Oran and elsewhere.Very little perspective on the pieds noirs (European-Algerians) was provided and a rather stilted perspective on the Salan coup was offered.There was nothing in the book to suggest the impending emergence of the OAS and little was given to suggest that something along the lines of the Evian talks (De Gaulle's negotiations with the FLN which ultimately ended the conflict) could emerge.As this monograph was originally issued by RAND in 1963 (and the war ended in 1962) this recounting of events presents a curiously removed perspective. RAND evidently requested a very specific report on Galula's own efforts, so perhaps the criticism is somewhat unfair.



"Pacification" illustrates the method for controlling the population (Galula acknowledges Mao here), the need for "policing", providing essential services and dometic security to the population.He also repeatedly and candidly states the need for controlling the population and provides several stark examples of his methods. He also allude to the reluctance of the military to engage in this sort of endeavor. Our military shares this perspective to a greater or lesser extent.



Above all, what this book does graphically acknowledge is the need for a specific, defined, focused and consistent political policy toward the insurrection.The FLN (and, I presume) the current adversaries the US faces in Southeast Asia grasped that we (unlike they) are not in the war for the long run. He writes, "One might even say that, in this sort of war, military action is but a minor facet of the conflict, a partial aspect of the operation.Give me good policy and I will give you good revolutionary war!"Cogent advice, indeed.



The FLN terror campaign coupled with a compelling ideology was seminal in defeating French domestic opinion (the real battleground) and driving the French from Algeria.The French had no ideology to propagandize, appeared as colonialists and had inconsistent and vacillating policies which were also unevenly applied. As a result of all that, they had no "theater" of their own to present.Galula minimizes the extent of the ideological dimension in the text, but makes a compelling case for it in the Appendixes of the book. Bruce Michael Jenkins, RAND's own terrorism expert noted that, "Terrorism is theater." Of course, that was perfectly understood by Frances FLN opponents, one of whom, Ramdane Abane, trenchantly observed that, "One corpse in a jacket is always worth more than 20 in uniform" which seems to me to convey a perfect understanding of the psychology of the intended audience;the "theatrical" dimension, if you will.Yet, by and large, Galula's adversaries, as depicted in the text of "Pacification" seem, in general, to be political bumpkins which (of course) they were not. A more specific propaganda program was presented in Appendix 3, but if and how this was implemented in Algiers (the epicenter of the conflict)was never clarified.While Kabilya was Galula's "laboratory", it was far remote from the real action in France and in the Algerian capital. But, Galula contends, what worked there should work elsewhere, too.





Regardless of these criticisms, this is an important book, one which was well deserving of reissue.Because of its very narrow perspective, the book should be read in conjunction with "Counterinsurgency Warfare" and, for additional insights into the Algerian situation, with Alistair Horne's book, "A Savage War of Peace".



Bruce Hoffman, who wrote the new introduction to "Pacification" and is himself a terrorism expert, noted in, "Inside Terrorism" (his 1998 book) that, "terrorism is where politics and violence intersect in the hope of delivering power." Galula understood that the need for counterinsurgents to forcibly divorce one from the other in the adversary's camp is the crux of destroying them both.

Posted on July 16, 2011

Ruby Mcfadin says...

Told from a narrative viewpoint, this account personalizes a low-intensity conflict and counterinsurgency.Captain Galula was revolutionary (no pun intended) in that he broke from traditional doctrine and experimented with new concepts in a new type of warfare.



This book is excellent because it reads more like a story than an instruction manual (like many counterinsurgency texts do).The reader can really get a feeling for what conditions were like on the ground and in the middle of a terrified population and a nationalistic guerrilla force.



Anyone in the military who might possibly be put in a situation where working within an indigenous population is required can only benefit from reading this text.

Posted on July 17, 2011

Willette Whitelaw says...

This classic from the RAND Corporation, first published in 1963, rightly deserves its reputation as the bible of counterinsurgency (COIN).While his other book, COIN: Theory and Practice, has received more attention over the last couple of years, this book gives a better portrayal of the tactical application of COIN best practices.



Galula describes his efforts at pacifying his small portions of Algeria during 1956-1958.Among the efforts he identifies, the most important factors to focus on include the realization that the population is the focus of military efforts; that political efforts have to be given equal weight to military activities; that getting the involvement of locals is of supreme importance.



This volume and Galaula's other book had significant influence on the writers of the US Army counterinsurgency field manual.Many of the activities described were also undertaken in one form or another in Iraq during 2007.



I highly recommend this book.

Posted on July 17, 2011

Winnie Holstrom says...

This book is an absolute required read for anyone who wants to understand the complex nature of fighting counter-insurgencies.Galula who served in Algeria as a deputy commander and as a company commander was responsible for the successsful pacification of several areas under his command. Through ideas he gained from experience serving in China he was able to institute a series of lethal and less than lethal measures to defeat the insurgents in his area of operation. He lists his measures and those who are energized can create a check list of sorts to assist them if they are "going down range." Excellent book...

Posted on July 20, 2011

Lavonda Churches says...

During 2005-6, it was becomming readily apparent that military situation in Iraq was going from bad to worse.In an effort to get the war effort back on track, many people from generals on down to Think Tanks that support the military began to re-examine many of our basic war fighting assumptions.The Rand Corporation went back into its vaults and re-published David Galula's classic 1963 study of counter-insurgency in Algeria.



From 1956 to 1958, David Galula was a captain in the French Army and stationed in the rugged mountains of coastal Algeria.His mission was to counter an insurgency of Algerian peasants who were fighting a war for national liberation.When he arrived in the Kabylia region of Algeria, the insurrection was beginning to pick up momentum. His duty was to pacify one small section of this mountainous region.He brought to this task a wealth of experience that he picked as the French military attache in Hong Kong in the early 1950's.From this posting, Galula had the unique opportunity to experience and learn from insurgencies in China, Indochina and Malaysia.



Unlike many of his contemporaries in the Paratroops and Foreign Legion (i.e. Roger Trinquier), Captain Galula was not an advocate of "modern" warfare with its emphasis on hard hitting combat and over-reliance on torture.His approach took on many of the aspects of social science.From the very beginning, Galula understood that in a "people's war" it was critical to segregate the civilian population from the insurgents.His approach emphasized policing over combat and providing services to the civilian population.



What makes "Pacification in Algeria" such a compelling read is that it concentrates on the experiences of one company commander in a small geographic area for a period of two years.By looking at a discrete area, one can understand that an insurgency is a much more complicated struggle than is usually understood from a distance.Insurgents can be motivated by such grand motivators as "nationalism" or a "clash of civilizations" but often as not, insurgencies are driven by more mundane things such as land and water rights,family fueds and inter-comunal rivalries.These complexities frustrate those who wish to see the world through a more manichean lense.For readers interested in more nuanced studies of insurgencies, I would recommend Lewis Taylor's "Shining Path; War in the Northern Andes" and David Stoll's "Between Two Armies in the Ixil Towns of Guatamala".

Posted on July 21, 2011

Rosena Alfisi says...

Counter insurgency is a difficult form of combat, perhaps the most difficult for the small unit commander to face.Galula covers most of the techniques for counter insurgency as well as most of the pitfalls.The French resulting to "field expedient" questioning techniques serves as a reminder of the hazards associated with short cuts.No doubt a similar revulsion will follow hard on the heels of today's waterboarding controversy.All in all a very rewarding read and a must for any field grade officer bound for Afghanistan or Iraq.In my experience I found this book to be much more relevant to today's insurgency than most books dealing with the subject.

Posted on July 21, 2011

Jeremy Laffredo says...

(1) This is a superb history book, by any standard.

(2) It is not about the last colonial war, but about (arguably) the first post-colonial war:

First suicide bombings?Algeria, in a dance hall full of teenagers, and at a soda fountain.

First big wall to keep out insurgents? Not Palestine, but between Algeria and Tunisia.

First war decided by domestic anti-war public opinion in a distant democracy? Algeria.

First war thrown away by a civilian government in which the military and intelligence services had probably turned the tide?Algeria.

This is a crazy confusing, searing, savagely brutal conflict that shook France to its roots, even more than the Boer war changed England, or the Vietnam war changed America; in which the rebels are riven by divisions amongst themselves, and the governing authority has to deal simultaneously with counter-revolutionary zealots running a private war, a military high command on the verge of rebellion, and an intelligence community in which it is at times difficult to know who is loyal to whom.



In the end, De Gaulle overruled his military and intelligence chiefs and threw away victory when the insurgents had lost by every meaningful measure, and were engaged in a bloody internal purge; when the top intelligence officer of the rebels was a french double agent; where the provincial reconstruction teams were actually making headway in providing widespread schooling and health care, and in improving standards of living.The French military and intelligence services were, at times, brilliant in identifying, and adopting a winning strategy.This is the blueprint of how a technologically advanced democracy can win an irregular civil war.

And then have it thrown away.

De Gaulle rewarded the suicide bombers with a victory they had not won, and gave enduring encouragement to religious fanatics and men of violence everywhere.He unintentionally threw away France's hydrocarbon reserves in North Africa.He condemned thousands of North Africans who had been faithful to France to reprisals of stomach turning barbarity.Towering arrogance matched with incomparable naivete, and staggering irresponsibility.What a legacy.



It was a stroke of idiocy that nonetheless unchained the French economy.France prospered as never before.Algeria was left to wallow in a bloody tyranny of extra-judicial killings that continues, on and off, even to the present day.

Pertinent to current events? Indeed. Extremists who adopt suicide bombings of civilian targets as (in their view) a legitimate tactic of war, are not fighting for anything worth fighting for, and, in being able to rationalise such tactics, also adopt the mentality that prevents them from lifting the resultant society out of violence and poverty.This book is suberb.



(3) If only there were a comparable book about the insurgency in Malaysia - the one insurgency that was defeated by very clever winning of public opinion along with use of the police and army.

(4) "Pied noir", although a term inextricably linked with the Algerian civil war, is not a term that is presently acceptable in polite discourse in France.

(5) There is a great deal to be learned from this excellent analysis.



In response to the second comment, I first read this book long before anyone heard of hanging chads in Florida.It won the Wolfson Prize in 1978, and can hardly be seen as having been slanted to fit subsequent history.Uncannily prescient.Unlike the commenter, I do not presume to know what the author would, or wouldn't agree with.

Posted on July 21, 2011

Roberto Merles says...

One of the things that perplexed and, frankly, disgusted me, throughout this book was the posturing of many key figures on the French side about "honour" and "grandeur". In pursuit of their honour, many of these people behaved in the most disgraceful and dishonourable manner.



They preened themselves on their honour and spoke volubly about "restoring the glory of France", but when the going got difficult, they mostly resigned their positions or simply abandoned their responsibilities - often to return later to repeat the whole disreputable process - or intrigue among themselves.



Perhaps a psychologist could shed more light on this cesspit of misplaced values than an historian.



But what of the other side - the Algerian independence movement?The alphabet soup of factions (FLN, CRUA, MTLD, UDMA etc etc) was liberally peopled by thugs, assassins, torturers and thieves.They squabbled among themselves, intrigued for office, occasionally betrayed each other, and terrorised their own people - all in the cause of Algerian independence.



Even after independence, members of the ruling clique continued to wage war upon each other and upon the Algerian people.The struggle continues to this day.



Ordinary Algerians on both sides were the victims of the war - as is ever the case.At its end, within months, almost all the "pied noir" population had fled the country in one of the great mass migrations of the post war era.Muslims who had worked and fought for the French and who were unable (or chose not) to flee were mercilessly hunted down.



I finished the book with a sense of disgust, of having been soiled by the mostly contemptible people shaping events on both sides.When one peers into a cesspit of struggling fanatics, one inevitably gets splashed.



However, readers should not be deterred from reading this book."A Savage War of Peace" deserves to be read.Its lessons are equally valid today in the Middle East and elsewhere.



The book gives an excellent account of the war from both French and Muslim sides, but while the latter was adequately covered in a factual sense, that side of the story was somewhat dry and impersonal.



To a large extent this simply reflects the availability of sources - and those willing to talk freely and honestly.The author claims to have been hampered by the "traditional secretiveness and suspicion of the Algerian Arabs" - especially when the possibility of assassination was ever present for those critical of the Algerian leadership.



Within these limitations, Horne gives an objective account of the 8-year war, during which up to 600,000 French military personnel were stationed in Algeria.As the struggle went on, both sides resorted increasingly to torture and terror to achieve their aims.



At one point military victory seemed in sight, although one must suspect that, had the French "won" in a military sense, the price would have been some sort of partition of Algeria into French and Muslim zones, and the permanent military suppression of the latter.Sound familiar?



Another conclusion one can draw from the book is that the relentless pursuit of an ideology rarely, if ever, results in a better life for ordinary people who are to be "improved".This was true for Communism and will probably be proven true eventually for the various forms of Islamic fundamentalism currently destroying lives in many parts of the world - and true also for ideologues on the other side who fight them in the name of freedom and democracy - and who are equally convinced of their righteousness.

Posted on July 24, 2011

Dusti Nephew says...

Alistair Horne is one of the preeminent historians of the 20th Century. I've read several of his books, including the entire trilogy on the three Franco - German wars. I've found each of his books excellent, but this one will always rate as his best - for the complexity of the material that he has mastered. In the preface is an impressive list of the principal actors interviewed. He acknowledged that it is virtually impossible to have seen the "entire picture," and suggests that no one will. He combines the specific information on the war with an overall splendid erudition.He tells the drama lucidly, with irony where appropriate, as it is so often.I first read this book over 30 years ago, and was even more impressed the second time around.



He draws you in immediately with the ironic title to his first chapter; a quote from former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, that Setif was "A Town of No Great Interest." It was in this non-descript town that the native Muslim Algerians revolted against the French at the end of the WW II, and were in turn brutally massacred. And it was near Setif that two young French teachers, "dedicated liberals", bookish and bespectacled, were murdered on All Saint's Day, 1954, in the commencement of Algeria's war of liberation.



Horne uses a wild range of sources for incisive epigraphs at the commencement of each chapter, and perhaps none is better than the one from Jonathan Swift: "In war opinion is nine parts in ten."That opinion was spun and spun again as events repeatedly outraced the expectations of the actors.



France first went to Algeria in 1830, colonizing it under the rubric of a "civilizing mission," (a forerunner of bringing the natives democracy). But they carried the seeds of their own destruction, believing their mission involved the education of the natives, and after a few generations, was it any surprise that the natives were asking: Where are our fraternity, equality and most definitely, liberty? Generations of white French, ironically called "pied noirs," considered the country there own too. Horne's strength in this work is his understanding and depiction of the numerous factions on the two principal sides. After the humiliating French defeat in Indochina, occurring only six months prior to the commencement of this struggle, it was imperative that they not lose again.Furthermore, unlike Indochina, Algeria was considered an integral part of France (though, of course, by in large, the Muslims did not get the vote). The struggle on the French side nearly lead to civil war.It did culminate in the collapse of the Fourth Republic, when tanks surrounded the key government buildings in Paris, in anticipation of an assault by rebel French paratroopers, lead by four French generals who had revolted. De Gaulle rode to the rescue, creating the Fifth Republic, and going to Algiers, where he gave his famous "Je vous ai compris" (I understood you) speech to the pied noirs. He was a master of ambiguity, and would ultimately betray pied noirs aspirations.



As for the political maneuvering and machinations on the side of the FLN (National Liberation Front), Horne is not able to describe as well, fundamentally because so many of the principals did not survive the war, or its immediate aftermath. Like in the French revolution of 1789, the revolution "consumed its children." He does quote some cri de coeurs of Frantz Fanon, one of the giants of the anti-colonial movement.



Complementing Horne's knowledge of the military tactics and strategy, he is equally adept at describing the intellectual struggles, with a principal axis being between Sartre-Beauvoir and Albert Camus.This culminated when the later, a pied noir, made the famous statement upon receiving his Nobel Prize for Literature: "I love justice; but I will fight for my mother before justice."



The book contains some excellent maps, a substantial bibliography, and extensive pictures of the main characters in the drama. Particularly haunting is one of a young boy arrested during a "ratonnade." (literally, a raid against the "rats.")



I strongly feel the book should be read as an excellent, almost certainly the best history of one of the major tragedies of the 20th Century. Inevitably though, the question is asked:What lessons can we learn?This question took on additional relevance when it was reported that George W. Bush was reading the book. As a cautionary counterpoint to projecting these events on other circumstances, after my reading of it 30 years ago, I firmly felt this was how a similar situation, a minority of whites, who considered their country home, ruling over a majority of native blacks, in South Africa, would be resolved - through bloody war. Fortunately the Algerian precedent did not hold, as a few principled persons made decisions that avoided that denouement. The circumstances in Iraq, for the United States, are quite different that France in Algeria.Nonetheless, there may be at least two "takeaways".One from Horne himself, who, in the preface to a recently released reprint, said that no country should adopt the tactic of torture, as the French did in Algeria, primarily for what it does to the values and soul of those who torture. Sadly, a significant minority of Americans follow Dick Cheney's lead in embracing torture. The other takeaway is to decide how we would view Camus's position: Would we adopt injustice on behalf of a false concept of "mother"?

Posted on July 25, 2011